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Abstract
Recent calls for greater openness in our private and public innovation systems
have particularly urged for more open disclosure and granting of access to interme-
diate works–early results, algorithms, materials, data and techniques–with the goals
of enhancing overall research and development productivity and enhancing cumula-
tive innovation. To make progress towards understanding implications of such policy
changes we devised a large-scale ﬁeld experiment in which 733 subjects were divided
into matched independent subgroups to address a bioinformatics problem under either
a regime of open disclosure of intermediate results or, alternatively, one of closed se-
crecy around intermediate solutions. We observe the cumulative innovation process in
each regime with ﬁne-grained measures and are able to derive inferences with a series
of cross-sectional comparisons. Open disclosures led to lower participation and lower
eﬀort but nonetheless led to higher average problem-solving performance by concentrat-
ing these lesser eﬀorts on the most performant technical approaches. Closed secrecy
produced higher participation and higher eﬀort, while producing less correlated choices
of technical approaches that participants pursued, resulting in greater individual and
collective experimentation and greater dispersion of performance. We discuss the im-
plications of such changes to the ongoing theory, evidence and policy considerations
with regards to cumulative innovation. (JEL O3, JO, D02)
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1I. Introduction
The Human Genome Project (HGP), which over a thirteen-year period identiﬁed more than
20,000 genes and sequenced the 3 billion chemical base pairs that make up the human DNA,
has been described as one of the most ambitious large-scale scientiﬁc eﬀorts in modern
times (Watson 1990; Collins 2010). The project marshaled the work of over a thousand
research scientists from more than 30 research laboratories spanning at least 19 countries. A
notable feature of HGP’s governance was the implementation of the “Bermuda Principles,”
whereby all participants released all their sequence data within 24 hours of discovery into the
public domain (Contreras, 2011). This resulted in a near instantaneous disclosure of results
with the intent that other investigators would build on these results and also to achieve
better coordination among the researchers (Bently, 1996), with the hope of more rapidly
advancing the science (Marshall, 1996; Cook-Degan and McCormack, 2001). This type of
early disclosure of advances signiﬁcantly departed from the usual practice of releasing ﬁnal
results and analysis in tandem with publishing a scientiﬁc journal article.
The practice of opening intermediate works–disclosing and granting access to them for
reuse by others–has has been observed in many areas and has long historical roots. Allen
(1983), for example, showed that the mid-nineteenth century innovation process underlying
the critical blast furnace technology for iron making, in UK’s Cleveland district, occurred
through informal disclosures and formal publications of design and cost information between
existing and new ﬁrms where technical and eﬃciency advances made by one ﬁrm were used
to achieve further performance gains by others. Nulovari (2004) documents similar disclosure
practices in the development of Cornish pumping engines, Bessemer steel and large-scale silk
production. There are also numerous modern examples. In open source software projects,
all manner of software development instructions are instantly made available for others to
see and reuse, as developers make submissions to the code base (Lerner and Tirole 2005;
Lerner and Schankerman 2011). Similar intermediate open disclosure practices have also
been implemented in the Polymath Project for creating mathematical proofs (Growers and
2Nielsen, 2011), Wikipedia (Greenstein and Zhu, 2012), computer hardware (Osterloh and
Rota 2007), synthetic biology (Torrance 2010) and in Netﬂix’s $1MM prize to improve its
user movie rating prediction algorithm. Apart from these existing examples, there have
been growing calls in recent decades for still greater openness, disclosures and access to
intermediate works–early results, algorithms, programmes, technology platforms, materials,
data, and techniques–upon which subsequent innovators, researchers, and inventors might
build (Nelkin, 1982; Lin 2012; Royal Society, 2012).
To study the eﬀects of intermediate disclosures on innovation, we devised an experimen-
tal approach. A total of 733 subjects (comprised of mathematicians, software developers,
scientists, and data scientists) participated in a two-week experiment in which subjects de-
veloped and optimized a genomics analysis algorithm to solve a core computational biology
problem faced both industrial and academic labs. The context can therefore be thought of
as a “quality ladder” of sorts, with participants developing solutions in relation to a single,
yardstick of quality and performance (Scotchmer, 2004, p. 132). Thus, we create a context
in which a set of players interact in a common domain over time, as the state of the art
evolves (with some players dropping out, some coming in, and some staying "in the game").
The experimental design essentially involved comparing independent subgroups of subjects,
matched on ability and randomized on other characteristics, working on the same problem
at the same time. Subjects also worked under similar institutional regimes in most every re-
spect, except some worked under open regimes in which intermediate solutions were disclosed
and made accessible to others within the same independent subgroup. Those in the closed
control group, to whom those in the open regime were compared, worked under conditions
in which intermediate solutions were not disclosed; only ﬁnal solutions were disclosed at the
end of the experiment. We observed characteristics of the individuals, including their ability
levels, and precise measures of quality of solutions. We devised novel means of codifying the
technical design approach used in each of the 654 intermediate and ﬁnal solutions submitted
during the course of the experiment.
3This experimental strategy gives us a chance to study typically large-scale institutional
design questions in a controlled context in which usual counterfactual outcomes can be
observed. The problem addressed has itself been exposed to a past cumulative innovation
process by both academic and industrial scientists over past decades of genome mapping
(Altschul et al., 1990), while necessarily drawing on knowledge in computer programming
and data science by the nature of the problem. The subjects are a mixture of professionals
and students at various levels of academic and professional attainment who largely reﬂect
the wide and diverse pool of representing a mix of skills in computer science, data science,
and algorithm design skills relevant to this problem. The best solutions developed in the
context of this experiment are indeed highly useful and have been disclosed to both the
academic and industrial scientiﬁc communities for their use, on account of them exceeding
the performance of benchmark solutions(see Lakhani et al., 2013). The experiment can
itself be considered large-scale in exposing the problem to hundreds of subjects within each
independent subgroup.
We implemented the experiment on an online platform so as to enable the application
of precise treatments and controls and to allow ﬁne-grained observations at the level of in-
dividual subjects and individual solutions contributed to the cumulative innovation process.
Especially notable here is the ability to exploit precise measures of ability, eﬀort, and activ-
ity and to discern technical approaches within individual intermediate solutions. Departing
to some degree from a fully naturally occurring context also provides a rare opportunity to
observe the complex series of endogenous processes as populations are exposed to distinct
“rules of the game.” At least as important, an experimental design allows us to study com-
pletely independent “risk sets” of prospective innovators exposed to alternative institutional
regimes. We can then derive inferences by making cross-sectional comparisons.
The reason for carrying out this research is that it is not clear what the eﬀects should
be. On the one hand, open disclosures of intermediate outputs might plausibly facilitate
ex post reuse of intermediate works (Furman and Stern 2011; Williams 2013), propelling
4cumulative innovation (Romer 1990). Intermediate disclosures of a wider set of inputs to the
innovation process might also “lower the bar” for a more diverse set of entrants to participate
(Murray et al., 2009). Further, high incentives of innovators might plausibly be maintained,
depending on what downstream innovators do with the disclosed material and if innovators
can somehow be recognized and rewarded for the disclosures they make. In a sense, this
is similar to disclosure in say academic publication (Dasgupta and David 1994; Stephan,
1996), the patent system (Kitch 1977) and subsequent to prize contests (Sobel, 1996); how-
ever, open disclosures of intermediate works often mean stepping way from these established
institutions (ex: a completed article, product, or invention) to facilitate a much freer ﬂow
of knowledge (e.g., Furman and Stern, 2011; Williams 2013), raising again the question of
rewards, recognition and incentives. The implementation of an intermediate disclosure pol-
icy may be in conﬂict with a basic tenet of the economics of innovation that diminished
control and appropriability over knowledge assets also has the potential to reduce incentives
to make costly investments, exert high eﬀort in their creation–or even to participate in the
innovation process altogether (Nelson 1959; Arrow, 1962). Open disclosures of intermediate
work might also aﬀect choices of technical approaches–on the one hand, perhaps inducing
diﬀerentiated innovation pathways (Murray et al., 2009) and wider range of possibilities
considered (Weitzman 1998). Greater disclosure might also expand the range and types of
actors who can participate eﬀectively in the innovation process (Murray et al., 2009). And
in so doing it may expand the variety of approaches taken. Alternatively, more disclosures
may just steering innovators towards incremental accretion of improvements along existing
pathways (Acemoglu, 2012).1
We organize our analysis around investigating eﬀects on both (i) the rate of innovation
and performance attained and (ii) the range and nature of technical approaches assayed.
Given myriad possible dynamics that might be set into motion, we do not constrain our
analysis or impose a structural interpretation. Rather our analytical approach is to begin by
1Ad i s t i n c tl i t e r a t u r ec o n s i d e r ss t r a t e g i cv o l u n t a r yd i s c l o s u r e s( e x :H a e u s s l e re ta l . ,2 0 0 9 ) .
5documenting diﬀerences in (i) and (ii) and then to explain these diﬀerences in terms of the
“types” of innovators choosing to enter and participate, the level of eﬀort they exert, and
the particular technical choices taken.
We ﬁnd a range diﬀerences produced by disclosures of intermediate works, beginning with
reductions in participation and activity levels on the order of 30% or more, depending on
the measure. Eﬀects are observed across the entire distribution of higher- and lower-ability
subjects. We interpret these patterns as consistent with diminished economic incentives
in a system of freer disclosures, particularly where disclosed knowledge was reapplied by
downstream innovators to addressing the same problem addressed by upstream innovators.
While there might be ways to attenuate this drop, the consistency of these results with
economic theory and remarkably large magnitude of the drop observed here deserve emphasis.
Participants in the open regime chose to focus their eﬀorts, lower as they were, on most
performant established technical approaches. This led participants in the open regime to
achieve higher performance scores than those in the closed regime. Scores where dispro-
portionately clustered in the “upper tail,” reﬂecting a concentration of solutions on most
performant technical approaches. The Herﬁndahl index for technical approaches, for ex-
ample, was 52% higher in the open regime. Thus “learning” here was constituted of both
knowledge transmissions and responding to signals conveyed in the open regime around the
quality of other solutions and actions of others. This led to coordinated technical choices,
focusing improvements along existing innovation pathways.
By contrast, participants in the closed regime engaged in substantially higher levels of
experimentation, with each active participant in the closed regime assaying 17% more tech-
nical approaches, as measured by combinations of techniques assayed. The diﬀerence in
aggregate experimentation was even higher–42% greater number of unique combinations of
techniques assayed–resulting from the combination of higher numbers of participants, higher
levels of individual experimentation, and greater independence of choices of technical ap-
proaches pursued. As each of the aforementioned eﬀects applied relatively uniformly across
6the skill distribution, implications apply equality to average outcomes as they do to the
maximal outcomes in each comparison group.
While heterogeneity of participants contributed to the range and level of results, open
disclosures of intermediate results did not change the “types” of participants who chose to
enter and actively participate, only their number. Despite considerable heterogeneity in the
overall pool of subjects (including 69 countries represented, a range of ability levels and
divergent technical interests), the distribution of skills and other characteristics of those
choosing to participate were remarkably similar across the regimes.
In relation to the academic publishing system, the patent system or prizes with dis-
closures of winning solutions–which attempt to reconcile and moderate tensions between
upstream or ex ante incentives, and downstream or ex post learning and reuse–the patterns
observed here indicate that intermediate disclosures strike more extreme tradeoﬀs. In a nut-
shell, within this single-problem environment, intermediate disclosures favored exploitation
of existing knowledge, rather than exploration across other potential technical approaches.
Intermediate disclosures also discouraged eﬀort levels taken by any one individual, including
highest-ability experts. Intermediate disclosures were found to be eﬀective in the context
studied here. However, intermediate disclosures should, for the same reasons, possess in-
herent disadvantages in contexts in which there are high returns to exploring unknown
approaches or in providing high incentives to most expert innovators.
Our ﬁndings contribute to a recent stream of research on the design of institutions sup-
porting cumulative innovation, and particularly the eﬀects of open disclosures and access
(e.g., Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein 2008; Mukherjee and Stern 2009; Murray et al., 2009;
Gans and Murray 2012). We underline the importance of this work, ﬁnding evidence that the
design of disclosure policies can produce ﬁrst-order changes in the innovation process. We
deviate somewhat from this work with our focus on intermediate disclosures (rather than,
as in this literature, comparisons of distinct disclosure systems as academic publication and
7patenting2). Whereas empirical research on open disclosures and access (e.g., Murray and
Stern, 2007; Rysman and Simcoe 2008; Murray et al., 2009; Boudreau 2010; Furman and
Stern, 2011; Galasso and Schankerman; Williams, 2013) has focused on eﬀects of disclosures
on ex post reuse, we study factors aﬀecting advances in technical performance. Williams
(2013) is closest to our interest in intermediate disclosures, studying genetic sequences placed
in the public domain, as part of the HGP. Our ﬁnding of intermediate disclosures discouraging
diversity and exploration in this single-problem environment might also be contrasted with
Murray et al.’s, (2005) ﬁnding of evidence suggesting open disclosures encouraged greater
reuse of a disclosed technology across alternative problems and applications.
Our work also complements the pioneering contributions attempting to consider the en-
dogenous emergence of diversity and experimentation (e.g., Murray, et al. 2009; Acemoglu,
2012), themselves based on a long line of rich theorizing on the rate and direction of scientiﬁc
and technical advance (e.g., NBER, 1962; Rosenberg, 1976; Mokyr 2002; Lerner and Stern,
2012). Above all, we ﬁnd that lack of coordination–particularly in context of higher incen-
tives and activity–that leads to heightened diversity in the closed regime by maintaining
independence of experimentation choices (Nelson, 1961). By contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence
within this single-problem environment that open disclosures widened the innovation process
to more diverse actors (Murray, et al. 2009), nor produced a wider consideration of possi-
bilities (1998); rather, open disclosures contoured eﬀorts towards less diversity (Acemoglu,
2012). In addressing the disclosure of intermediate works, in particular, this paper also links
distinct research in areas such as open source software (e.g., Lerner and Tirole, 2005), digi-
tal “mashups” of music and multimedia (Lessig 2009) and other seemingly exotic corners of
the modern economy to the study of more mainstream institutions. As regards research on
cumulative innovation and growth, more broadly (e.g., Romer, 1990, Aghion and Howitt,
1992, Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Aghion et al. 2005; etc.) we illustrate the possibility that
2Nor is our intent here one of contributing to the debate on the workings and eﬀectiveness of patents
(e.g., Moser 2013)–which involves questions of the eﬀectiveness of disclosures, apart from the question of the
eﬀects of disclosure, in principle..
8“lab”-like settings can be exploited to study the innovative process.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II presents the experimental design. Section
III describes the data. Section IV reports results. Section V discusses concludes.
II. Experimental Design and Methods
A. The Problem Addressed by Subjects in the Experiment
We anchored our experimental design on a problem for which we expected to observe
a sequence of cumulative innovation. We worked closely with colleagues at the Harvard
Medical School to “layer” our experimental treatments within a biomedical research eﬀort
to create solutions to a bioinformatics algorithm development problem (see Lakhani et al.,
2013 for greater detail). The speciﬁc problem involved creating new algorithms enabling the
identiﬁcation and annotation of the constituent gene components of immune system related
genetic sequences that had been recombined and mutated. Subjects in our experiment had
to develop de novo operational algorithms, written in computer code, that could annotate
10^5 genetic sequences (a typical high throughput genetic sequencing run) with performance
characteristics (accuracy of annotation and speed of annotation) that would meet or exceed
current benchmarks used by academic and industrial research labs such as the US National
Center for Biotechnology Information’s MegaBLAST program and the internal Harvard so-
lution.
An u m b e ro ff e a t u r e so ft h i sp r o b l e mm a d ei ta t t r a c t i v ef o rs t u d y i n gp r o c e s s e so fc u m u -
lative innovation, where both continuous advance and experimentation might play a role.
As a problem sitting at the intersection of software development, mathematics, computer
science, and bioinformatics, it is nontrivial and challenging, it is subject to the application
of a range of techniques and draw from a range of knowledge. Further, as an optimization
problem without a closed-ended solution, but rather one in which numerical methods could
be applied to eke out incremental gains, we could observe how eﬀorts taken by subjects result
9in additional gains (rather than simply observing discrete outcomes of correct or incorrect
outcomes). In these senses of representing a complex, data-intensive numerical optimization
problem that cuts across knowledge domains, it is a kind of problem that might be encoun-
tered in a wide range of contexts, from industrial innovation to academic research. Focusing
on algorithm development, we are also able to treat intermediate solutions themselves as a
primary input to subsequent innovation processes–to which other subjects might practically
gain access through disclosure. (Conducting an analogous experiment in which intermediate
work took the form of physical or living materials, such as research mice, would make carry-
ing out the experiment far less practicable for obvious reasons.) Working in digital format,
where solutions are codiﬁed in computer instructions, carries a range of other advantages
that are detailed in following discussion.
B. The Experimental Context
We ran the experiment on an online platform to practically and precisely implement
treatment and controls, to enable the observation of ﬁne-grained measures, and to draw
from a wide, relevant, and diverse population of prospective participants. The experiment
was run on the TopCoder platform–a large online platform on which algorithmic developers,
data scientists, software developers, mathematicians, and practitioners of these areas within
various industries participate in a regular stream of competitions to solve problems. Among
the several hundred thousand expert algorithm and software developers who are members of
the platform, 733 chose to participate in the experiment. In recruiting subjects through the
TopCoder website and distribution lists, we explained the duration of the experiment, the
magnitude of cash payoﬀs, and that the problem would be an algorithmic problem for the
Harvard Medical School. Among the 733 individuals who participated in this experiment,
roughly half (44%) were computer and data science professionals and the remaining were
students at various levels of achievement. Participants came from 69 countries.
Running the experiment on the TopCoder platform provided a medium in which we could
implement a precisely controlled environment. We worked with TopCoder executives and
10engineers to implement the platform designs described herein. A number of features of the
environment were common to all experimental groups. For example, all development and
interactions were to take place on the online platform. Working through a web-based Internet
connection, participants were given the problem at the start of the experiment. It was also
stated at this time that scoring would be based on a combination of accuracy and speed
of execution. The web-based interface featured a development area in which participants
could develop their algorithmic instructions in computer code. They could then compile
and test that code in a wide range of leading computer languages, submitting their code for
compilation to the central platform where it was run and–if successfully compiling–would
then be tested against test data sets that subjected solutions to a raft of tests. A numerical
performance score related to accuracy and speed of execution would then be returned to
the participant. Thus, it was not possible to receive direct feedback on the quality of the
submission “oﬀ line.” Participants’ ﬁnal submissions were taken as the basis for determining
winners.
C. The Experimental Institutional Regimes
The experimental design involved comparing matched independent subgroups of subjects,
working on the same problem, at the same time, in with same general features of the insti-
tutional context–but under distinct disclosure regimes. In our open regime, all intermediate
solutions were available for review by all other participants within the regime. In implement-
ing this regime, there is of course no single “disclosure lever” to implement open disclosure
of intermediate solutions (cf. Dasgupta and David, 1994). A set of closely related design
changes were devised to implement this institutional design. This design begins with the
choice to implement a relatively frictionless “click-through” system to allow participants to
instantaneously observe each others’ solutions through the same web interface on which they
conduct their development. Further, we elected for the disclosure of intermediate solutions to
take the form of the working computer code, itself. Consistent with open disclosure systems
11in practice, we implemented an accompanying system of attribution whereby those reusing
ideas could “cite” the solutions on which they drew. (This would also have implication for
payoﬀs, as below.)
Our comparison or “control” group was a closed regime, which involved neither disclosure
nor access to intermediate solutions over the two-week experiment. Only ﬁnal solutions were
disclosed after the conclusion of the experiment. No technical mechanism was made available
for sharing within the experimental context during the experiment and participants were
explicitly instructed not to share solutions under threat of being disqualiﬁed. Nonetheless,
multiple intermediate solutions were submitted to the platform prior to ﬁnal solutions on
account of the need to receive feedback on solutions in a regular trial-and-error development
process.
For both the groups working under rules of open disclosure and those working under rules
of closed nondisclosure, payoﬀs were awarded after each week. The top ﬁve participants in
each group were publicly acknowledged on the TopCoder website. The top ﬁve slots in each
of the two weeks were allocated a total of $1000 in cash prizes ($500, $250, $125, $75, and
$50). In Open/Disclosure, half of each of the monetary prizes was allocated to those cited in
winning solutions. Those cited within the winning solutions were also publicly acknowledged
on the TopCoder website, alongside winners.
D. The Assignment of Subjects to Independent Trials
One of the most important design decisions related to the size (equivalently, number)
of trials and comparison groups constructed with the 733 experimental participants. Above
all, we prioritized creating groups that were as large as possible. In so doing, we could best
reﬂect “policy experiment” in which populations of prospective entrants would be exposed
to alternative regimes and could elect to enter and actively participate, or not. Thus we
created a single large “Open/Disclosure” group that engaged in development over the two
weeks under a regime of open disclosures of intermediate work; and we created a single large
12“Closed/Nondisclosure” group, which engaged in development over the two weeks under
ar e g i m eo fc l o s e dn o n d i s c l o s u r e . J u s to n eo t h e rg r o u pw a sc o n s t r u c t e dt os u p p l e m e n t
our two main Open/Disclosure and Closed/Nondisclosure groups. Given our priority to
construct large trials and consequently run a minimum of trials, the supplementary regime
was constructed to gain greater assurance that results in main groups were not somehow
eccentric, while also providing another perspective to support interpretation of patterns.
Therefore, we constructed a “Mixed” group. The Mixed group worked under a closed regime
during the ﬁrst week of the experiment and an open regime during the second week. In each
of the three groups, participants were matched on skills otherwise randomly assigned. This
was done by ordering the set of subjects according to their TopCoder skill rating (Section
III) from top to bottom, and then assigning successive sets of ability “triplets” to each of the
three groups.
E. The Approach to Statistical Inference
In broadest outlines, our empirical strategy is analogous to that of past research, involving
comparisons across regimes. Rather than attempting to directly discern the particulars of
the endogenous cascade of interacting dynamics within an on-going cumulative innovation
process, prior research has focused on making more or less square comparisons between
outcomes in open regimes and comparison regimes. Predominantly, these comparisons have
been made in the style of diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences, as regimes have switched while others
have not (e.g., Huang and Murray, 2009; Murray et al., 2009; Boudreau, 2010; Williams,
2013). Closely kindred papers making comparisons across academic and industrial teams,
both making disclosures through similar mechanisms, has proceeded with analogous cross-
sectional comparisons, attempting to more or less match or control for the nature of the
discovery (e.g., Moon, 2011; Bikard, 2012). Here too we make square comparisons across
regimes, in this case by precisely constructing matched comparison groups.
Given the design, we are able to regress a series of outcome variables, denoted here
simply as y, on an indicator variable switched to one for participating in Open/Disclosure
13(OpenDisclosure)a n dac o n s t a n t ,↵, where   is a coeﬃcient and " is a zero-mean error term,
with subjects indexed by i:
yi = ↵ +   · OpenDisclosurei + "i (1)
Apart from cross-regime variation, it should be noted too that subject characteristics
denoted by ✓–and particularly ability skills level on which groups are precisely matched–
serve as another source of variation we are able to exploit to derive inferences. Both the
mean outcome and response to open disclosure plausibly depend on the type of participant
(e.g., Murray et al., 2009). The following expression captures this elaboration of the analysis,
where the zero-mean error term, ",h a sb e e nr e - d e ﬁ n e da c c o r d i n g l y :
yi = ↵(✓i)+  (✓i) · OpenDisclosurei + "i (2)
We estimate all models using both OLS and nonparametric methods, as elaborated within
the analysis. To emphasize, the design allows us to compare matched sets of prospective en-
trants, as we wish to observe both participation and non-participation stimulated by the
experimental regimes. Nonetheless, we also report comparisons of outcome variables, condi-
tional on participation. In the very least, such comparisons remain substantive and mean-
ingful descriptive comparisons. Whether diﬀerences in outcomes conditional on participating
can be interpreted as reﬂecting a treatment or selection eﬀect are questions explored within
the analysis. These questions relate closely to theoretical claims that greater openness may
“lower the bar” and bring greater diversity to the pool of entrants (e.g., Murray et al., 2009)
or perhaps attract participants of varying quality (cf. Furman and Stern, 2011).
14III. Measurement and Data
We collected information on the characteristics and activities of subjects within the experi-
ment, and characteristics of solutions they generated. Our econometric analysis focuses on
cross-regime comparisons concerning the 245 subjects assigned to Open/Disclosure and a
comparison group of 244 subjects assigned to Closed/Nondisclosure. Within the results, we
also present data from the 244 subjects assigned to the Mixed regime, in a supplementary
fashion. This section presents the data set and variables collected during the experiment.
A. Measuring Performance
As regards quality, here we beneﬁtted from an automated scoring suite, made possible by
running the experiment on an online platform, whereby subjects could submit their their code
to the platform and nearly instantaneously receive feedback on the quality of their solution as
it was tested against a test data set that resided on the platform. The scoring mechanisms,
algorithm, and test data sets were developed by personnel from Harvard Medical School
and TopCoder working in collaboration. A numerical score was recorded in each instance,
reﬂecting the speed and accuracy of each submission, as applied to the test data sets. The
ﬁnal score of each subject, ProblemSolvingScore,w a st h a to ft h eﬁ n a ls u b m i s s i o no fe a c h
participant. It was on the basis of this score that ﬁnal rank order was determined. The
variable ProblemSolvingScore was bounded from below by a minimum score of -7.14 and
ranged upwards to a maximum of 0.80, where larger values indicate higher performance.3
Those subjects choosing not to participate were given the minimum score.
B. Measuring Technical Approaches
3There are no substantive interpretations of negative versus positive scores. An original raw scalar (x)
ranging upwards from zero to 1255.5 was transformed as -ln(1255.6-x), to equally weight what what might
otherwise appear to be small diﬀerences near the top of the linear scoring spectrum. Therefore, the value
-7.14 is simply -ln(1255.5). This transformation does not qualitatively change results, but increases statistical
signiﬁcance.
15Apart from developing a precise measure of solution quality, we observed technical ap-
proaches taken. This too was made possible by running the experiment on an online platform,
so as to observe solutions. We hired three Ph.D.-level experts to examine each of the 654
intermediate and ﬁnal solutions. These experts identiﬁed ten key elemental optimization
techniques used within the population of solutions. (Details are described in Lakhani, et al.
(2013)). Thus, each submission was coded in terms of a 10-digit binary code representing a
combination of techniques. There were 56 unique combinations developed across the entire
experiment. (The performance and quality of a given solution can be understood as depend-
ing on the technical approach or combination of techniques used and the degree of reﬁnement
of the approach.) Within our analysis, we study the number of techniques assayed across
both intermediate and ﬁnal solutions by a subject (NumTechniquesTried). We also study a
separate count of the subset of those techniques that appear in the ﬁnal solution of a sub-
ject (NumTechniquesInFinal). In addition, we analyze the number of distinct approaches or
combinations of techniques that were assayed by each subject (NumCombinationsTried).
C. Measuring Participation, Activity and Eﬀort
We also observe several measures of activity and eﬀort exerted by subjects. At a most
basic level, we measure whether individuals decided to actively enter and participate, with an
indicator variable switched to one for those participants who submitted at least one solution
(Participated). As submissions served as a means of engaging in trial-and-error development,
the count of number of submissions made by a subject (NumSubmissions)a l s os e r v e da sa n
indication of the level of development activity. We also separately asked active participants
to self-report the number of hours they worked (HourWorked)i naq u e s t i o n n a i r ea f t e rt h e
completion of the survey and prior to announcing winners, for which 60% of participants
responded. Given the self-reported nature of these data and their partial coverage, we
simply refer to these data as a means of corroborating our analysis of NumSubmissions as
our preferred indication of activity levels.
16D. Treatment Eﬀects and Subject Characteristics
We record an indicator variable switched to one for subjects assigned to Open/Disclosure
(Open/Disclosure). We also measure characteristics of individual subjects. Most important
is a precisely-measured rating of their ability or skill level (SkillRating). The skill rat-
ing of participants on the TopCoder platform is based on an Elo-based system (Maas and
Wagenmakers, 2005), that estimates skill on the basis of historical performance in similar
algorithmic problem-solving exercises. (The average participant engaged in dozens of prob-
lems prior to the experiment.) The Elo system is standard in a range of contexts from chess
grandmaster tournaments to US College Bowl systems to the National Scrabble Association
and the European Go Federation. We use a normalized version of this measure (i.e., with
mean set to zero and deviations measured in numbers of standard deviations). We supple-
ment this ability measure with measures of other characteristics of individuals, including
the technical area they were most interested in at the time they joined as a member to
the TopCoder platform, chosen from a ﬁnite list of options presented to them at that time.
We also observe country of origin, again based on self-reporting at the time they joined as
a member to the TopCoder platform. (Descriptive statistics of these latter variables are
provided within the analysis, itself.)
IV. Results
A. Overview of Results
Here we begin by presenting broad patterns of outcomes to establish most basic facts,
with following subsections proceeding to analyze and explain these facts.
Regarding the advance in quality and performance of solutions, an overview of the streams
of submissions generated in each experimental regime appears in Figure I. A total of 654
solution submissions were made over the two-week experiment across the three independent
groups. Intermediate solutions appear as grey dots, indicating timing (x-axis) and quality
17(y-axis). Final submissions are black dots. The graphs also trace maximal frontier lines
and moving averages. These descriptive patterns, on their own, begin to suggest diﬀerences
between the regimes. In our main comparison groups, the standard deviation of ﬁnal scores
in Open/Disclosure is 2.88 points and that in Closed/Disclosure is smaller, but still large, at
1.81. This is because scores are bounded from below and, within Open/Disclosure, solutions
are clustered on the “right tail” of maximal scores. In Closed/Nondisclosure, solutions are
clearly far more evenly dispersed from low- to high-quality solutions. Within the supple-
mentary Mixed regime, we observe patterns that would appear to be somewhat consistent
with these distinctions, with relatively evenly dispersed solutions in the ﬁrst (closed) week
and submissions becoming sparser and weighted towards the maximal frontier in the second
half.
<FIGURE I>
Regarding the extent and range of experimentation that the experimental regimes lead
to, Figure II plots the generation of unique combinations or “technical approaches” over
time in each of the independent groups, where a unique approach is the ﬁrst appearance
of a submission embodying a particular combination of elemental techniques. We include
here, once again, the supplementary Mixed regime to illustrate that it traces an intermediate
level between Open/Disclosure and Closed/Nondisclosure. We ﬁnd large diﬀerences, with
27 unique combinations assayed in Closed/Nondisclosure and 19 in Open/Disclosure: 30%
fewer technical approaches assayed in Open/Disclosure than in Closed/Nondisclosure. Apart
from the large magnitude of diﬀerences in levels of experimentation across combinations of
techniques, diﬀerences between Open/Disclosure and Closed/Nondisclosure are systematic
and stable in the sense of having no “crossing points” between the curves.
<FIGURE II>
18Our main analysis to follow analyzes these diﬀerences and their causes, focusing on our
main open and closed comparison groups. We return to the mixed regime as a means of
validating results and our interpretation in summarizing and discussing patterns.
B. Does Open/Disclosure Aﬀect Incentives, Activity and Levels of Participation?
Here we document evidence of much lower activity and incentives in Open/Disclosure. We
begin by studying subjects’ decisions to enter and actively participate (indicated by having
submitted at least once). Results of OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors are
presented in Table I. Model (1) simply regresses an indicator for having participated on a con-
stant and an indicator variable for participating in Open/Disclosure. In Open/Disclosure,
the probability of participating was was 14%, or 5% lower than in Closed/Nondisclosure.
Model (2) adds our skill measure as a control, and model (3) adds an interaction between
skill and the indicator for Open/Disclosure. While the positive coeﬃcient on SkillRating
suggests higher-skilled individuals have a generally higher propensity to participate–whatever
the regime–the interaction term is not signiﬁcantly related to participation decisions. There-
fore participation is generally lower in Open/Disclosure, with not diﬀerence detected across
subjects at diﬀerent skill levels.
To verify these results, Figure III presents the results of a more ﬂexible model, comparable
to model (3), but which allows model (3) to be re-estimated non-parametrically using a
locally-weighted second-order polynomial employing an Epanechnikov kernel (DiNardo and
Tobias, 2001; Silverman, 1986). Conﬁdence intervals presented in Figure III are simply
estimated parametrically so as to increase eﬃciency in estimating these bounds.4 This ﬂexible
estimator aﬃrms the eﬀect of open disclosure on entry and active participation appears to
be invariant to skill level. Therefore, open disclosure did not result in a change of skills
distribution, only a lower level of entry in general.
4Using parametric or nonparametric estimates of these bounds does not substantially aﬀect the conclusions
of the analysis presented in Figure III; however, eﬃciently estimating these bounds becomes more important
in later analysis in which we use just a subset of the observations to compare just those subjects who chose
to participate.
19<TABLE I>
<FIGURE III>
Also consistent with lower incentives in Open/Disclosure, we observe lower activity and
eﬀort. Model (4) regresses our observational measure of activity levels, the number of sub-
missions (an indication of trial-and-error activity), on an indicator variable for participating
in Open/Disclosure and a constant term. The average number of solution submissions made
per individual in Open/Disclosure was 0.4, 0.9 less than the average of 1.3 submissions in
Closed/Nondisclosure. Adding our skill measure and interaction with Open/Disclosure in
models (5) and (6), we see that numbers of submissions were higher in Closed/Nondisclosure
and among higher skilled participants. The negative interaction term in model (6) is neg-
ative, indicating that–counting the non-participants who did not submit as zero–that the
boost of activity in Closed/Nondisclosure is higher still among the higher-skilled subjects.
Adding these additional regressors does not change the estimated coeﬃcient on OpenDisclo-
sure. These patterns are clariﬁed in the ﬁrst panel of Figure IV, which graphically shows
the estimated relationships in the form of ﬂexible, nonparametric estimates.
Models (7) through (9) re-estimate models (4) through (6), but just for participants who
actively participated, i.e., with at least one submission (N = 79). Therefore, these regressions
measure diﬀerences of activity among active participants. As in model (7), active participants
in Open/Disclosure submitted 3.1 solutions–3.9 fewer than the 6.9 in Closed/Nondisclosure,
as reported in model (7). Therefore, by this measure activity levels were less than half in
Open/Disclosure. Measures of skills and interactions between skills and the Open/Disclosure
indicator are insigniﬁcant, conditional on participating, as reported in models (8) and (9).
Therefore, it appears the earlier eﬀects of these variables were driven by the decision to par-
ticipate (i.e., the change between zero and one submissions); the eﬀect of Open/Disclosure on
activity levels conditional on participating appears to be constant across the skills distribu-
tion. These patterns are aﬃrmed in ﬂexible, nonparametric estimates presented in the second
20panel of Figure IV. Despite a wider conﬁdence interval on account of fewer observations, the
number of submissions is a good deal higher in Closed/Nondisclosure–and ﬂat across abil-
ity levels. These earlier ﬁnding that likelihood of participation with Open/Disclosure does
not interact with skill is equivalent to saying the skills distribution in either regime is the
same. (Later, more exhaustive tests conﬁrm this.) Therefore, we interpret estimated ef-
fects of Open/Disclosure in models (7) through (9) as treatment eﬀects, whereby the regime
inﬂuences behavior conditional on entering.
To further validate our interpretation of lower incentives and eﬀort in Open/Disclosure,
we analyzed a separate measure of eﬀort and activity, the number of hours worked by par-
ticipants. This provides a more direct measure of eﬀort, but with the disadvantage of being
self-reported. The survey achieved a response rate of 60% (N = 47). Of those active par-
ticipants who responded, those in Open/Disclosure worked 15 hours on average, while those
in the Closed/Nondisclosure worked 21 hours. As presented in the third panel of Figure
IV, despite the partial response rate and self-reported data, we see large and statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences).5
<FIGURE IV>
C. How Does Open/Disclosure Aﬀect the Type of Subjects Participating?
Here we examine whether there were diﬀerences in the types of individuals who entered
and actively participated in open and closed regimes.As regards the quality or skill level
of entrants, the preceding analysis found that the lower participation in Open/Disclosure
was not related to skill, suggesting no systematic diﬀerences in the distribution of the
skills variable, SkillRating.B e y o n d t h e s e e a r l i e r t e s t s , t h e ﬁ r s t p a n e l i n F i g u r e V e x p l i c -
itly plots the empirical cumulative distributions of SkillRating in both Open/Disclosure and
5Al i n e a rO L Sr e g r e s s i o nm o d e lﬁ n d st h a tr e p o r t i n gp a r t i c i p a n t si nt h eO p e n / D i s c l o s u r ew o r k6f e w e r
hours than those in Closed/Nondisclosure, signiﬁcant at p = 10%. The linear model does not detect a
statistically signiﬁcant relationship with SkillRating, despite the apparent downward slope in Figure IV. The
interaction between skills and an indicator for the Open/Disclosure regime is also insigniﬁcant.
21Closed/Nondisclosure and ﬁtted cumulative Normal distribution functions. The plots clar-
ify similarities in the curves. Tests for diﬀerences in ﬁrst and second moments of these
distributions are presented in Table II, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Apart from these
parametric tests, we also applied a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of diﬀerences
in distribution (Justel et al., 1997), which essentially measures the supremum of the set of
vertical distances between the empirical cumulative distribution functions. (Thus, this test
makes no assumptions regarding the structure or form of distributions.) We are unable to
reject the null hypothesis that the observed distributions are drawn from the same underly-
ing distribution in relation to the maximal distance between the distributions. (In relation
to Closed/Nondisclosure having lower skills than Open/Disclosure, at p = 18%; in relation
to Open/Disclosure having lower skills than Closed/Nondisclosure, at p = 80%).
Supplementary to these tests on SkillRating,w ep e r f o r m e da n a l o g o u st e s t so no t h e r
measures likely to be correlated with ability, including the number of instances in which
they had participated in analogous TopCoder events to develop new algorithms in the past.
We also studied the year in which they joined the platform. Empirical distributions are
again plotted in Figure V and parametric comparisons performed in Table II. We again ﬁnd
remarkably similar distributions and no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
<FIGURE V>
Apart from ﬁnding no evidence of diﬀerences in the distribution of “high” or “low” quality
participation, it remains possible that other kinds of diﬀerences might still exist. For exam-
ple, apart from general algorithmic problem-solving ability, active participants may diﬀer in
specialized knowledge or experience. We ﬁnd no evidence of such diﬀerences. As regards
technical interests, TopCoder collected on the stated main technical interest of participants
from 45% of subjects. These include categories described as follows: Broadband; Data, Voice,
Video Convergence; Game Software Development; Graphic Design; Handheld; Networking;
Security; (General) Software Development; Web; and Wireless. General Software Develop-
22ment, Games Development, and Web Development were the largest categories. We report
diﬀerences across the most common categories and “Other” (including non-respondents) in
Table III and ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Even Herﬁndahl indices are re-
markably similar. For Open/Disclosure the Herﬁndahl index for all individual categories,
including non-responses is 0.396; for Closed/Nondisclosure it is 0.427. If we drop the non-
respondents and calculate the Herﬁndahl just for participants who reported a main interest
among the earlier listed categories, the Herﬁndahl drops considerably but remains similar
across regimes, at 0.606 and 0.740.
Likewise, TopCoder collected country data on 100% of members. Table III also shows the
distribution of the population of subjects and those of active participants in either regime,
listing the top countries–India, USA, Russia, China–along with 65 “Other” countries. We
again ﬁnd no statistical diﬀerences. The Herﬁndahl for participants in Open/Disclosure is
0.082 whereas that for Closed/Nondisclosure is 0.089. Therefore, despite the considerable
scope for diﬀerences to emerge across the many countries with their respective comparative
advantages, local knowledge, and local labor market conditions, we ﬁnd little diﬀerence.
<TABLE II>
<TABLE III>
D. Does Open/Disclosure Aﬀect Performance and Technical Approaches?
It is not possible to detect signiﬁcant diﬀerences in performance scores across all sub-
jects (assigning minimum scores to non-participants), as in the ﬁrst panel of Figure VI.
This might itself be regarded as remarkable, given subjects in Open/Disclosure worked 6
fewer hours than did those in Closed/Nondisclosure, while having no observable skill diﬀer-
ences. Moreover, the problem solving scores are even statistically and substantially higher
in Open/Disclosure, once examining performance conditional on participating, as shown in
23the second panel of Figure VI. Active participants in Open/Disclosure attained 0.67 higher
scores on average (half a standard deviation of the score measure). Given the equal compo-
sition in observable characteristics in each regime, we interpret these diﬀerences as largely
reﬂecting causal treatment eﬀects rather than selection eﬀects.
<FIGURE VI>
The earlier results concerning performance would suggest participants learned a great
deal more within Open/Disclosure on the basis of observing others’ solutions, rather than
only engaging in private trial-and-error experimentation. It follows we should expect to see
tangible diﬀerences in the nature of solutions and the solution process. These diﬀerences
can indeed be readily observed when comparing the number of individual optimization tech-
niques assayed across all submissions, as in panels 1 and 2 of Figure VII. Conditional on
participating, those in Open/Disclosure tried out 0.81 more techniques on average. They
also implemented 0.64 more techniques in their ﬁnal solutions, as in panels 3 and 4 of Figure
VII. Deploying greater numbers of optimization techniques in large part accounts for the
higher performance attained by those in Open/Disclosure. (Note, however, that despite the
importance of numbers of techniques in aﬀecting performance score, the very highest scoring
techniques did not employ the greatest number of techniques; they beneﬁtted from the choice
of particular combinations of techniques and the eﬀectiveness with which these were reﬁned
and implemented.)
<FIGURE VII>
Despite greater learning in Open/Disclosure, there are indications of considerably lower
levels of experimentation. This was ﬁrst suggested by more clustered solutions documented
in Figure I. It should also be noted that despite having tried 0.81 more techniques and
24having been exposed to many more, participants in Open/Disclosure assayed fewer com-
binations of these techniques (panels 5 and 6 in Figure VII).6 Conditional on submitting,
those in the Open/Regime assayed .71 fewer combinations of techniques, with 1.67 versus
1.96 combinations assayed in open and closed regimes. This is especially notable given that
the greater number of techniques individuals could “see” in Open/Disclosure would on their
own allow for greater number of combinatorial possibilities. In addition to lower overall
levels of experimentation (Figure II) and lower levels of individual experimentation (Panels
5a n d6o fF i g u r eV I I) ,t h e r ea r ea l s on om o r en o v e lt e c h n i q u e sd e v e l o p e dper individual.
While diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant, it is notable that each subject in the open
regime even develops 0.03 fewer novel combinations on average than those in the closed
regime and each active participant develops 0.02 fewer, if we deﬁne novel techniques as the
ﬁrst appearance of a given combination within a regime. This is because is developing novel,
unprecedented combinations within Open/Disclosure should be inherently easier where there
are fewer unique combinations altogether.
The lower levels of experimentation by participants in Open/Disclosure also appear to
be more targeted towards performant established solutions. This too could ﬁrst be ap-
preciated from Figure I with progressively greater clustering of solutions in the upper tail
around maximal scores. This convergence itself accounts for the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
performance in Open/Disclosure. The simple fact that higher performance was achieved
with lower levels of trial-and-error (i.e., submissions) and with narrower experimentation
(i.e., combinations of techniques) itself demonstrates more coordination and “targetedness”
of contributions in Open/Disclosure. We performed several additional comparisons to fur-
ther corroborate these points. For example, we rank ordered the 56 distinct combinations
of techniques that appeared in all submissions across the entire experiment and rank or-
dered their “potential” in terms of the highest score attained across multiple solutions using
that approach and found that each of the ﬁnal submissions of those in Open/Disclosure
6The signiﬁcance is higher in unconditional comparisons given the combination of greater individual
experimentation and greater participation in Closed/Nondisclosure.
25were above the median-scoring approach. The Herﬁndahl measuring the concentration of
solutions across diﬀerent approaches is also 52% higher, at 0.149 in Open/Disclosure versus
0.0986 in Closed/Nondisclosure. Also consistent with less experimentation and diversity in
Open/Disclosure, ﬁnal solutions appeared in three programming languages in that regime
(C#, C++, and Java), whereas in Closed/Nondisclosure 8.7% of ﬁnal solutions also came
from two additional languages (Python and Visual Basic).
D. Comments on the Mixed Regime
While the design of our experiment is best geared to evaluating cross-sectional diﬀerences
between open and closed regimes, we ran a mixed regime to guard again the possibility of
eccentric results, given that our design emphasized minimum replication and maximal size
of group assignment. The results in the mixed regime appear to corroborate the general
patterns found in open and closed regimes. Both the descriptive patterns of submissions
and scores, and development of novel combinations of techniques appear to be “between”
the patterns observed in open and closed regimes, at least in broadest brush strokes. While
the experiment is not designed to evaluate dynamic patterns, several descriptive facts bear
noting. For example, while the mixed regime is in between the open and closed regimes
in its generation of performance and diversity, the results hardly conﬁrm that the mixed
regime is a simple “average” of the open and closed regimes. For example, the mixed regime
engenders far more active participation in its second (open) week, in terms of participation
and submissions, than did the open regime during this second week. Further, the mixed
regime appears to have a higher trajectory of maximal performance in the second week than
either the open or closed regime. As a descriptive fact, it also appears that the level of
experimentation, as measured by the number of unique combinations assayed also ascends
quickest in the second week, among all regimes. Therefore, while the mixed regime serves its
purpose of aﬃrming results in open and closed regimes are not driven by eccentric results,
at the same time the patterns begin to suggest that performance in an open regime in the
26second week may not have been independent of the fact that the knowledge accumulation
process during the ﬁrst week was closed. Thus, the patterns begin to suggest a non-ergodic
nature of knowledge accumulation with bearings on subsequent patterns of development.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we devise an experimental approach to allow us to investigate eﬀects of an
open regime in which all intermediate solutions were disclosed and accessible to all subjects
working on developing solutions to an algorithmic innovation problem that was amenable
to cumulative innovation. Our analysis compared outcomes in this open regime with those
in a closed regime in which no solutions were disclosed until the end of the experiment.
Subjects in our experiment created solutions to a challenging bioinformatics problem that
both industrial and academic labs face, and one that has been subject to a process of cu-
mulative innovation outside of our experiment. Our subjects possessed relevant aptitudes
and a mix of skills to address the problem at hand. Thus, while there are unavoidable costs
of departing from a natural context of innovation, we attempted to minimize these costs in
conveying experimental methods to the evaluation of this policy question shaping scientiﬁc
and technical progress (Marburger, 2005; Azoulay, 2012).
Our experimental design has the further advantage of overcoming the often unavoidable
challenge of studies of naturally occurring contexts in which regimes under comparison are
typically not entirely independent, as it is diﬃcult to establish that scientists or other sorts of
innovators drawn to diﬀerent regimes are truly drawn from independent pools of prospective
participants or “risk sets.” Crucially, our design allows us to not only maintain independent
groups who are then exposed to distinct institutional regimes, but we also are able to precisely
match the risk sets on the basis of their abilities and randomize on other characteristics. We
were also able to provide novel and precise ways of measuring both performance attained or
solution quality and choices of technical approaches in the alternative regimes.
27The chief mechanisms shaping technical performance produced by intermediate disclo-
sures related to incentives and “learning” of a sort. The lower appropriability aﬀorded by
freer disclosures coincided with drops in participation and development activity, consistent
with longstanding theories of economic incentives to make investments in innovation (e.g.,
Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). (These patterns perhaps deserve special emphasis in the context
of this experiment, as such a comparison is typically not possible without explicitly observing
matched risk sets of prospective entrants.) Particularly striking is the magnitude of drops
in incentives and participation.
We might expect freer, intermediate disclosures to also produce large drops in incentives
in contexts beyond just this study. The practical limits of fully recognizing and reward-
ing upstream contributions should only be made more diﬃcult in a system of intermediate
disclosures; intermediate disclosures may relate to a wider range and greater number of in-
complete and possibly less standardized and less vetted works. More subtly, attribution
may become inherently more diﬃcult where a ﬁnal work is the result of the contributions of
as e q u e n c eo fa c c u m u l a t i n gi n t e r m e d i a t ed i s c l o s u r e s ,a n a l o g o u st op r o b l e m so fa t t r i b u t i o n
in teams, for example. Nonetheless, drops in incentives might at least be partially atten-
uated where institutions might somehow be designed to better protect the appropriability,
interests, motivations, rewards and recognition of innovators (in some way that does not
impede disclosures, to the extent that is possible).7 Further, any drop in incentives might
to some degree be attenuated outside a single-problem quality ladder, as studied here, for
example participants being able to diﬀerentiate their innovations and create complementary
7For example while open source development projects are staﬀed by volunteer and part-time contributors
(exerting relative low eﬀorts) they are drawn from a massive pool of prospective participants from a global and
substantially larger than what most ﬁrms can employ. In addition participation is often driven by intrinsic
motivations and an ability to directly use modiﬁcations in one’s own work or education. Open source projects
also beneﬁt from nuanced informal governance (e.g., culture, trust and norms) to implement reputational
payoﬀs, along with more formal mechanisms such as “signatures” in the code. Similarly large pools of
contributors are available for Wikipedia with analogous concerns. By contrast, the Bermuda Principles
in the HGP reﬂected the decision of project organizers and funding agencies (and by extension, public
authorities, more generally) to actively subsidize intermediate disclosures and implementing incentives for
these intermediate disclosures by both promising continued funding for the projects and threatening sanctions
for non-participation.
28technologies (Bessen and Maskin, 2009).
Notwithstanding the drop in incentives and participation observed with disclosures of
intermediate works in the experiment, the negative incentive eﬀects in this case were out-
weighed by positive learning eﬀects. “Learning” here is not just the result of knowledge
transmissions per se;t h es i g n a l sg e n e r a t e db yo p e nd i s c l o s u r e sc o o r d i n a t e da n dd i r e c t e d
development and inventive activity towards more highly performant technical approaches.
Therefore, while subjects tended to conserve their eﬀorts, when they did invest their eﬀorts,
participants by and large expected to achieve higher returns from adding to already estab-
lished approaches than from attempting to pioneer altogether brand new approaches to the
problem at hand. This meant not only focusing on existing performant approach, but also
choosing to pursue far less experimentation altogether.
This tendency to conform and build on existing successful approaches might be expected
in contexts beyond that of this experiment. For example, the result is analogous to the more
general notion of the emergence of technological trajectories or scientiﬁc paradigms, which
create powerful incentives to conform to existing innovation pathways in solving a particular
problem (Kuhn, 1962, Dosi 1982). While convergent outcomes were more productive in our
particular innovation problem, it is possible to imagine innovation and development contexts
in which disclosures may experience more frictions and “learning” of the sort described here
could converge on an inferior approach and technical pathway (e.g., David, 1985), i.e. partici-
pants in our open regime converged on the “globally” best solution, rather than converging on
some “local” inferior approach. Features of our context might have been especially congenial
to converging approaches. For example, the problem addressed here was particularly given
to cumulative innovation, in the sense it was possible to aggregate multiple optimization
techniques. The disclosure environment was also relatively frictionless. Thus, while interme-
diate disclosures may tend to nudge innovation eﬀorts towards already existing approaches,
there may be some ability to moderate this eﬀect. Apart from instituting some frictions
(eﬀectively limiting intermediate disclosures), it is also plausible that greater diversity and
29experimentation might be “seeded” by adding still more heterogeneity or greater numbers of
participants than what was observed in our experiment and by removing the constraint of
being on a single quality ladder.8
Beyond contributing to the existing literature on the eﬀect of supporting institutions
on cumulative innovation, our paper also raises important questions for policy makers re-
sponsible for innovation. Given modern scientiﬁc and technological progress in a range of
domains depends on cumulativeness of knowledge, with current innovators heavily relying on
the discoveries of earlier eﬀorts of others, the design of policies that enable both investment
in innovation and disclosure to others will be increasingly important for economic growth.
8For example in the HGP, entirely all follow on development was in highly diﬀerentiated analysis of the
data sets that were produced, therefore entirely avoiding the kinds of substitution between upstream and
downstream developers.
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TABLES	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
TABLE	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
OLS	 ﾠREGRESSIONS	 ﾠOF	 ﾠPARTICIPATION	 ﾠAND	 ﾠACTIVITY	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Columns  (1)  through  (6)  report  models  that  are  estimated  using  data  from  the  489  subjects  in 
Open/Disclosure  and  Closed/Nondisclosure.  Subjects  in  each  regime  are  matched  on  SkillRating  and 
otherwise randomized.  Columns (7) through (9) reports estimates based on the 79 actively participating 
individuals in those regimes. Estimates are from OLS. Numbers in brackets are standard errors, estimated by 
bootstrapping. The annotations of *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
TABLE	 ﾠII	 ﾠ
COMPARISON	 ﾠOF	 ﾠMEANS	 ﾠAND	 ﾠSTANDARD	 ﾠDEVIATIONS	 ﾠOF	 ﾠABILITY	 ﾠMEASURES	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Columns (1) and (2) report mean and standard deviation for the entire experimental population of 733 subjects 
(equivalent to those individual groups, given the assignment procedure). Columns (2) and (7) report values among 
those subjects choosing to participate within Closed/Nondisclosure. Columns (3) and (8) report values of participants 
in Open/Nondisclosure. Column (4) and (5) reports the differences and standard error of this difference in means 
within brackets. These differences are not statistically significant at customary levels. Column (9) reports the ratio of 
estimated variance in the two regimes. This ratio is not statistically significant at customary levels.  
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Dependent Variable:
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OpenDisclosurei -.05* -.06* -.06** -.90*** -.95*** -.95*** -3.9*** -4.0*** -3.8***
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.32) (.26) (.26) (1.1) (1.0) (1.2)
SkillRatingi .06*** .07** .34** .56*** .16 .37
(.02) (.03) (.13) (.21) (.45) (.77)
OpenDisclosurei × SkillRatingi -.01 -.41* -.49
(.04) (.24) (.92)
Constant .19*** .19*** .19*** 1.3*** 1.3*** 1.4*** 6.9*** 6.9*** 6.8***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.29) (.25) (.25) (.92) (.90) (1.04)
Adj R-Squared .00 .03 .03 .02 .03 .04 .12 .10 .09
Participatedi NumSubmissionsi
NumSubmissionsi, 
Conditional on 
Participating
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pop. 
Mean
Closed 
Active 
Participants
Open Active 
Participants
μopen - 
μclosed
Std. 
Error
Pop. Std. 
Dev.
Closed 
Active 
Participants
Open 
Active 
Participants
σopen^2 / 
σclosed^2
SkillRating .00 .26 .48 .23 (.24) 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.06
NumPastParticipations 27.3 41.3 43.2 .1 (13) 43.0 8.0 9.9 1.1
YearJoinedPlatform 2006.5 2006.0 2006.0 0.1 (.39) 1.9 1.7 1.6 0.9
Mean (μ) Standard Deviation (σ)	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TABLE	 ﾠIII	 ﾠ
COMPARISON	 ﾠOF	 ﾠPROPORTIONS	 ﾠOF	 ﾠPARTICIPANT	 ﾠCHARACTERISTICS	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Column  (1)  reports  the  probability  of  a  given  individual  in  the  entire 
experimental  population  of  733  subjects  (equivalent  to  those  individual 
groups, given the assignment procedure), equivalent to the proportion in the 
population. Columns (2) and (3) report values among those subjects choosing 
to participate within Closed/Nondisclosure and Open/Nondisclosure. Column 
(4) reports the difference in means. Column (5) reports the standard error of 
this difference in brackets. All differences are not statistically significant at 
customary levels.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Population 
Proportion
Closed Active 
Participants
Open Active 
Participants
μopen - 
μclosed
Std. 
Error
Technical Area of Primary Interest
Software 34% 52% 39% -13% (11%)
Games 4% 2% 6% 4% (4%)
Web 2% 2% 3% 1% (4%)
Other 60% 43% 52% 8% (11%)
Country
India 20% 7% 12% 5% (6%)
USA 16% 15% 15% 0% (8%)
Russia 9% 15% 9% -6% (8%)
China 9% 11% 12% 1% (7%)
Other 46% 52% 52% -1% (12%)	 ﾠ 	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FIGURES	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
FIGURE	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠCumulative	 ﾠInnovation	 ﾠProcess:	 ﾠSubmissions	 ﾠand	 ﾠSolution,	 ﾠBy	 ﾠRegime	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ figure	 ﾠ plots	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ incidence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ intermediate	 ﾠ solution	 ﾠ submissions	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ indicated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ grey	 ﾠ dots	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ final	 ﾠ
submissions	 ﾠby	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠindicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠblack	 ﾠdots.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠaxis	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠhours	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2-ﾭ‐week	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠaxis	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquantitative	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠ
(an	 ﾠamalgam	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeed	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccuracy)	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach	 ﾠsubmission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠautomated	 ﾠtest	 ﾠsuit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
black	 ﾠline	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximal	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠof	 ﾠscores	 ﾠattained	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠregime	 ﾠis	 ﾠtraced	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠchart.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠred	 ﾠline	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠmean.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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FIGURE	 ﾠII	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠExtent	 ﾠof	 ﾠExperimentation:	 ﾠCumulative	 ﾠCount	 ﾠof	 ﾠUnique	 ﾠApproaches,	 ﾠby	 ﾠRegime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠof	 ﾠ654	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcoded	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠten	 ﾠelemental	 ﾠoptimization	 ﾠtechniques.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ
plots	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccumulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠwas	 ﾠused	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
regime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvertical	 ﾠaxis	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠcount	 ﾠof	 ﾠunique	 ﾠapproaches.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠaxis	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠhours	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2-ﾭ‐week	 ﾠexperiment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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FIGURE	 ﾠIII	 ﾠ
Willingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠParticipate:	 ﾠProbability	 ﾠof	 ﾠParticipating,	 ﾠby	 ﾠRegime,	 ﾠby	 ﾠSkill	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠplots	 ﾠa	 ﾠregression	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠsubmission)	 ﾠin	 ﾠOpen/Disclosure	 ﾠand	 ﾠClosed/Nondisclosure,	 ﾠstratified	 ﾠby	 ﾠskill	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠarea	 ﾠ
shows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ90%	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠinterval	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClosed/Nondisclosure	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ black	 ﾠ dashed	 ﾠ line	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ flexible,	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠ estimator	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ locally	 ﾠ weighted	 ﾠ quadratic	 ﾠ
polynomial	 ﾠfit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠshort	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠline	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠestimator	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Open/Disclosure	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠ
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FIGURE	 ﾠIV	 ﾠ
Willingness	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Exert	 ﾠ Effort:	 ﾠ Measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Activity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Effort,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Regime,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Skill,	 ﾠ
Unconditional	 ﾠand	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠon	 ﾠParticipating	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠplots	 ﾠa	 ﾠregression	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠand	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠOpen/Disclosure	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Closed/Nondisclosure,	 ﾠstratified	 ﾠby	 ﾠskill	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠplots	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubmissions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠ(an	 ﾠ
indication	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrial-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐error	 ﾠactivity)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠsubjects,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐participants.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠplots	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubmissions	 ﾠof	 ﾠsolutions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠonce).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
third	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠplots	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠhours	 ﾠworked,	 ﾠas	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐reported	 ﾠby	 ﾠparticipants.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠarea	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ90%	 ﾠ
confidence	 ﾠinterval	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClosed/Nondisclosure	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠblack	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠ
line	 ﾠshows	 ﾠa	 ﾠflexible,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠestimator	 ﾠbased	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠquadratic	 ﾠpolynomial	 ﾠfit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠ
short	 ﾠ dashed	 ﾠ line	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ analogous	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠ estimator	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ relationship	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Open/Disclosure	 ﾠ
regime.	 ﾠ
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FIGURE	 ﾠV	 ﾠ
Nearly	 ﾠEquivalent	 ﾠAbility	 ﾠDistributions	 ﾠAmong	 ﾠParticipants:	 ﾠDistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠAbility	 ﾠAmong	 ﾠ
Active	 ﾠParticipants,	 ﾠby	 ﾠRegime	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpanels	 ﾠplot	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠskills	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠchose	 ﾠto	 ﾠactively	 ﾠ
participate.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠboth	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠcumulative	 ﾠdistributions,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfitted	 ﾠparametric	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠ
approximations,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ Open/Disclosure	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Closed/Nondisclosure.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ panel	 ﾠ plots	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Elo-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠ
measure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ability	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ solving	 ﾠ algorithmic	 ﾠ problems,	 ﾠ SkillRating.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ panel	 ﾠ plots	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
instances	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠparticipated	 ﾠin	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠevents	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplatform	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast,	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
experiment,	 ﾠNumPastParticipations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠplots	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcohort	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipants,	 ﾠYearJoinedPlatform.	 ﾠ
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FIGURE	 ﾠVI	 ﾠ
Performance:	 ﾠProblem-ﾭ‐Solving	 ﾠScore,	 ﾠby	 ﾠRegime,	 ﾠby	 ﾠSkill,	 ﾠUnconditional	 ﾠand	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Participating	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Each	 ﾠ panel	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ figure	 ﾠ plots	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ regression	 ﾠ line	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ performance,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ measured	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ final	 ﾠ scores,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
Open/Disclosure	 ﾠand	 ﾠClosed/Nondisclosure,	 ﾠstratified	 ﾠby	 ﾠskill	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠarea	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ90%	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠ
interval	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClosed/Nondisclosure	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠblack	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠline	 ﾠshows	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠflexible,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠestimator	 ﾠbased	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠquadratic	 ﾠpolynomial	 ﾠfit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠshort	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠ
line	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠestimator	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOpen/Disclosure	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠ
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FIGURE	 ﾠVII	 ﾠ
Technical	 ﾠApproaches	 ﾠand	 ﾠExperimentation:	 ﾠNumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠTechniques	 ﾠAssayed	 ﾠand	 ﾠImplemented	 ﾠin	 ﾠFinal	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠNumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠCombinations	 ﾠTried,	 ﾠby	 ﾠRegime,	 ﾠby	 ﾠSkill,	 ﾠUnconditional	 ﾠand	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠon	 ﾠParticipating	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ panels	 ﾠ plot	 ﾠ numbers	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ techniques	 ﾠ tried	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ submissions	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ subject,	 ﾠ unconditional	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
conditional	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ participating	 ﾠ (i.e.,	 ﾠ submitting	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ once).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ fourths	 ﾠ panels	 ﾠ plot	 ﾠ numbers	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ techniques	 ﾠ
implemented	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠsolution,	 ﾠunconditional	 ﾠand	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠon	 ﾠparticipating.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirth	 ﾠand	 ﾠsixth	 ﾠpanels	 ﾠplot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠcombinations	 ﾠof	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠtried	 ﾠby	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠacross	 ﾠall	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsubmissions,	 ﾠunconditional	 ﾠand	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
participating.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ grey	 ﾠ area	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 90%	 ﾠ confidence	 ﾠ interval	 ﾠ estimated	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ linear	 ﾠ OLS	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
Closed/Nondisclosure	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠblack	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠline	 ﾠshows	 ﾠa	 ﾠflexible,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠestimator	 ﾠbased	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠ
quadratic	 ﾠpolynomial	 ﾠfit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgrey	 ﾠshort	 ﾠdashed	 ﾠline	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parametric	 ﾠestimator	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Open/Disclosure	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠ
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